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defendant; (3) It must not have been due to any voluntary
action of contribution on the part of the plaintiff." 17
The difficulty of proof arises chiefly with respect to the first
element. The passenger in the ordinary case, being ignorant of the
chain of circumstances producing the injury, is at an obvious dis-
advantage in attempting to prove that such circumstances exclude
any reasonable explanation of the unusual occurrence other than the
carrier's negligence. Yet, if the passenger is prohibited from invoking
the doctrine until he has excluded non-negligent explanations, a strict
reading of the traditional rule of res ipsa would almost invariably
forbid the use of the doctrine in the average passenger-carrier situ-
ation. In its strict traditional sense, res ipsa relieves a plaintiff from
showing specifically that defendant's negligence caused the injury,
but substitutes an obligation of proving that nothing else caused it.
It is indeed the rare case wherein a plaintiff may draw any great
solace from the substitution; and by the same token, it is indeed the
rare case in which the doctrine, under strict application of its tradi-
tional requirements, may be invoked at all.
One thing, however, may be stated as obvious: if a strict adherence
to traditional prerequisites of res ipsa is continued, then certainly the
inference permitted when the doctrine is invoked successfully should
be raised to the full dignity of a presumption. The doctrine is practi-
cally valueless when it first requires plaintiff to exclude, by proof
of circumstances, all reasonable explanations of the injury other
than defendant's negligent conduct, yet rules that a mere permissible
inference is the most that can result.
The writer's conclusion, therefore, is that some liberalization of
the traditional requirements of res ipsa loquitur is necessary before
the dictum of Justice Currie in the principal case can be freely
accepted, and res ipsa applied in any but the most isolated passenger-
carrier cases. At the same time, it would appear that the passenger's
problem of proof would be eased to a greater extent by such liberal-
ization than by the Louisiana rule shifting the burden of proof to
the carrier.
RALPH E. ANFANG
Income Taxation-Deductibility of Advertising Expenditures-
Taxpayer corporation, engaged in the business of designing, manu-
facturing and installing laboratory equipment, printed and distributed
catalogs to its representatives to be used as reference books in making
sales of equipment. In the years of 1944, 1945, and 1946 the taxpayer
incurred costs as a result of printing a new catalog which was pub-
1 PRossER, TORTS, §43, p. 295 (1941).
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lished September 1, 1946. The taxpayer deducted these costs on its
tax returns as current business expenses for the years in which the
expenditures were incurred. The Commissioner, sustained by the Tax
Court, disallowed the deductions and determined that the cost of the
catalogs was recoverable only through amortization over a period of
five years, the useful life of the catalogs, to begin at the date of pub-
lication. Held: Reversed. An expense such as advertising cannot be
capitalized in the absence of evidence showing with reasonable cer-
tainty the benefits resulting in future years from the expenditure.
E. H. Sheldon & Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 214 F.
2d 655 (6 Cir. 1954)
Under section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a de-
duction is allowed for all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.
Assuming the existence of a trade or business, advertising is generally
within section 162, and hence deductible. The Regulations issued
under the 1939 Code indicate that normally advertising expense
satisfies the requirements of this section :2
"Business expenses deductible from gross income include the
ordinary and necessary expenditures directly connected with
or pertaining to the taxpayer's trade or business***. Among
the items included in business expenses are *** advertising and
other selling expenses***."
and prior decisions are in accord.3
Although an unusually large expenditure in a taxable year may
still meet the requirements of ordinary and necessary in section 162,-
difficulty arises where all or a portion of the expenditure bears some
of the characteristics of an investment rather than an expense. If
the expenditure is a capital investment, then it is not deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense.5
Section 263 of the Code entitled "Capital Expenditures" provides
that no deduction shall be allowed for any amounts paid out for new
buildings or for improvements which increase the value of any prop-
erty.6 The only reference to advertising expenses is in subsection (b)
which relates to a specialized treatment of expenditures in reference
to the excess profits tax.7 It is apparent on its face that section 263
168A STAT. 45, 46 (1954).
2 Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-1.
3 Transamerican Corp. v. U.S., 107 Ct. Cl. 177, 65 F. Supp. 470 (1946); Julia
Dahl et al, Exec., 24 B.T.A. 1167 (1931); Hennepin Holding Co., 23 B.T.A.
119 (1931) ; B. F. Boyer Co., 4 B.T.A. 180 (1926) ; Edwin C. Brandenburg, 4
B.T.A. 108 (1926); Ray Crowler et al., 19 T.C. 329 (1952).
4Appeal of First National Bank of St. Louis, 3 B.T.A. 807 (1926).5Alling & Cory Co., 7 B.T.A. 574 (1927).
6 INT. REV. CODE §263.
7
INT. Rrv. CoDE §263 (b) : "EXPENDITURES FOR AD vERTiSING AwD GooD WL-If
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does not force the capitalization of expenditures for advertising. What,
then, is the relationship of the problem illustrated in the Sheldon case
and the Internal Revenue Code? The true nature of the problem is
one of tax accounting. Under section 446(b) the Commissioner is
given the power to compute the taxable income of a taxpayer in order
to clearly reflect income.8 The Sheldon case is but an illustration
of this power in operation, for it is the Commissioner who is insisting
that the advertising expenditure be capitalized.
If an expenditure for advertising is capitalized, several possibilities
present themselves, depending upon the factual pattern of each case.
As a consquence of the expenditure a depreciable asset may have
been acquired. Should this in fact be the situation, then it would seem
that the cost of such asset may be recovered through depreciation
deductions under section 1679 even though the asset is personal prop-
erty.10 The effect of this is to allocate to the income produced over a
period of several taxable years a corresponding proportionate share
of the advertising cost of producing that income. Closely related in
tax effect, a second situation may present itself where there is a
definite relation between the expenditure and an item of income, such
as the purchase of one or more advertising contracts having a life
of more than one year. It has been held proper in such a case to capi-
talize the expenditure and prorate it over the life of the contracts."
This is analogous to the deferred expense approach utilized to allocate
the prepaid cost of fire insurance over the life of the contract.'12 Still
one other potential pattern remains. Where the object of the adver-
tising is primarily some promotional scheme to bring the taxpayer's
product before the public eye or to impress upon the public mind a
trade name or slogan, then capitalization of such an expenditure would
result in an intangible asset, such as goodwill or trade name. The
effect of this is to hold dormant the expenditure at least until the
business is sold or terminated in some way, since goodwill does not
lend itself to allowances for depreciation. 1 3
a corporation has, for the purpose of computing its excess profits tax credit
under chapter 2E or sub-chapter D of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1939 claimed the benefits of the election provided in section 733 or section
451 of such code, as the case may be, no deduction shall be allowable under
section 162 to such corporation for expenditures. for advertising or the promo-
tion of good will which, under the rules and regulations prescribed under
section 733 or section 451 of such code, as the case may be, may be regarded
as capital investments."
8 INT. REv. CoDE §446 (b).
9 INT. REv. CODE §167.
lo Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(1)-2.
" United Profit Sharing Corp. v. U.S., 66 Ct. Cl. 171 (1928).
12 Commissioner v. Boylston Market Ass'n., 131 F.2d 966 (1st Cir. 1942) ; George
S. Stephenson, 37 B.T.A. 1117 (1938).
13 Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(1)-3. Bills Bros. Memorial Corp., 7 B.T.A. 1182 (1927);
Bryson Jones, 17 B.T.A. 1213 (1929); U.S. Alcohol Co., 42 B.T.A. 1323, 1346
(1940), aff'd on this issue, 137 F.2d 511 (2nd Cir. 1943).
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The Sheldon case, now under consideration, afforded the Circuit
Court of Appeals an opportunity of explaining precisely what test is
to be used in determining whether an expenditure relating to adver-
tising is to be capitalized. The court proceeded to analyze the fact
situation presented by applying concepts reaching back to 1926 as
exemplified in a Board of Tax Appeals decision, Appeal of North-
western Yeast Co.1 4 . In that case a corporation expended large sums
of money in an advertising and promotion campaign. Although the
petitioner kept records showing the allocation of the expenditure, it
failed to show the proper segregation and allocation between current
expense and capital investment. In refusing to allow the petitioner to
capitalize a part of the expenditure, the court said :25
Generally and theoretically *** it is safe to say that some part
of the cost of a campaign or system of promotion may be of
permanent significance and may be regarded as a capital in-
vestment rather than a deductible expense. But how far in a
given case the recognition of this doctrine may require the
capitalization of some expenditures and the charging off of
others is hard to say. Clearly when the question is submitted
for judicial consideration, it may not be answered ab inconven-
ienti by an arbitrary rule.
The effect of this case was that the Board of Tax Appeals had
admitted that some part of advertising expenditures for promotional
plans represents a capital investment in the future and that the other
part is a current expense. The court left the burden of proving that
segregation and allocation on the one asserting the propriety of capi-
talizing a part of the expenditure. Thus, while admitting the theoreti-
cal possibility, the whispered undertone of the decision was that there
was a practical impossibility of sustaining such a burden of proof.
Other subsequent cases have followed this decision still insisting on
the theoretical possibility.16
In 1946, the Tax Court in X-Pando Corporation1 7 explained and
further limited the theoretical possibility concept of the Northwestern
Yeast Co. regime.:" X-Pando Corporation underwent a shift in owner-
ship in 1937. One of the results of the new blood in the business was
the adoption of a promotional plan which was to have a duration of
about three years. The officers of the petitioner were aware that
145 B.T.A. 232 (1926).
15 Ibid., at 237.
16 Three-In-One Oil Co. v. U.S., 35 F.2d 987, 68 Ct. Cl. 518 (1929) ; Morris Coal
Co. v. Commissioner, 48 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1931) ; Houston National Gas Corp.
v. Commissioner, 90 F.2d 814 (4th Cir. 1937); Richmond Hosiery Mills, 6B.T.A. 1247, aff'd 29 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1928); Mead Cycle Co., 10 B.T.A. 887(1928) ; Rome Iron Mills, Inc., 10 B.T.A. 1202 (1928) ; Conrad & Co., 13 B.T.A.1332 (1928) ; George W. Caswell Co., 14 B.T.A. 15 (1928).
377 T.C. 48 (1946).
's Supra, notes 14 and 16.
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some of the money expended was to reap current income and some
future income. A special account was set up as an asset to which a
fixed percentage of the expenditures were charged; the remainder of
the exenditure was treated as a current business expense. No con-
tention was made that any tangible property was acquired except for
some plates used in the preparation of advertising circulars. The
petitioner attempted to amortize the "Business Development Account"
on the basis of a five-year useful life. In deciding that the petitioner
could not properly amortize the expenditure, the Tax Court empha-
sized that, with the exception of the Colonial Ice Cream Co.19 and the
F. E. Booth20 cases, the cases following the Northwestern Yeast Co."
decision all dealt with the possibility of allowing the taxpayers to
include a portion of the advertising expenditure in their invested
capital and did not involve the issue of amortization and deduction
from gross income in future years.
The conclusion of the X-Pando decision is that where large sums
have been expended for advertising and either the taxpayer or the
Commissioner asserts that all or a portion of such expenditure should
be capitalized and amortized on the basis of a useful life, the test to
be used is twofold in nature: (1) can the party maintaining the posi-
tion sustain the burden of proving to a reasonable certainty the proper
segregation and allocation between current expense and capital ex-
penditure, and (2) is there some justification for claiming the deduc-
tions in subsequent years. The court states :2
"If we were to admit here petitioner's theory that because it
anticipated no current return on some portion of its expendi-
tures, but expected benefits therefrom in later years, that
portion has the quality of a capital investment, and if we were
to further admit that petitioner has succeeded, where so many
others have failed, in establishing by proof the proper propor-
tion which the capital items bore to the total expenditures, we
would still be required to find statutory authority for the de-
19 7 B.T.A. 154 (1927). The taxpayer had paid out substantial sums for organiza-
tion and advertising expenses and for the purchase of certain ice cream cab-
inets. It attempted to treat the sum as a deferred expense, to be spread over
three years. The Board of Tax Appeals concluded that the amount spent for
ice cream cabinets was to be depreciable over the three-year life of the
cabinets, and that the organization expenses could be capitalized. In reference
to the advertising expense, there was recognition that the benefits received
would extend over a period of years, but the board felt that it was impossible
to determine the extent of the expenditures which were capital in nature.
2021 B.T.A. 148 (1930). The taxpayer spent large sums of money in a pro-
motional campaign to increase the sale of canned sardines. It attempted to
spread the total cost of $105,000 over a period of several years. The Board of
Tax Appeals held that the deduction of advertising expenses sought in later
years should not be allowed because it was impossible to segregate the capital
from the current expenses.21 Supra, note 14.
227 T.C. at 53.
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ductions in some later years, since deductions are a matter of
legislative grace."
The Tax Court in the Sheldon case reconciled its decision that
the total expenditure should be capitalized by invoking the principle
that :24
"***if a taxpayer purchases an asset having a useful life of
several years and uses it to advertise its products over several
years, its cost is not deductible as an expense of the first year."
The decisive factor in the Tax Court decision is the recognition that
the taxpayer actually purchased an asset, namely trade catalogs. Once
this is established there is really no need to search for a proper segre-
gation and allocation between current expense and capital expendi-
ture. This very segregation is in fact accomplished when a useful life
is attributed to the asset and a reasonable amount is allowed for de-
preciation. Other cases have handled the problem in the same manner.
For instance, in Alling & Gory Co.25 the expenditure was capitalized
when certain sample cabinets and samples were found to have a use-
ful life and value as an income-producing factor extending beyond
the tax year in which the items were purchased; in Liberty Insurance
Bank, 6 savings banks used as advertising novelties were held
to be capital expenditures and the deductions were spread over a four-
year period; and in Peninsular State Bank of Detroit," small auxiliary
safes loaned to depositors to accumulate savings were held to be
capital expenditures.
Invoking the statutory power of the Circuit Court of Appeals to
review findings of fact of the Tax Court if clearly erroneous,28 the
circuit court in the Sheldon case completely ignores the fact that the
total expenditure in controversy resulted in trade catalogs, and applies
the subjective criteria originating in 1926 in Appeal of Northwestern
Yeast Co. In the opinion of the writer the evidence presented in the
Tax Court should not have been overlooked. The catalogs were clearly
tangible assets. They did not affect the income of the corporation
until after the publication date on September 1, 1946. Certainly it
would not be clearly reflecting income to allow the amounts spent
in 1944, 1945, and early 1946 to be deducted as ordinary and necessary
business expenses when the money expended had as yet produced no
income. The evidence also established that as a matter of fact the
catalogs did benefit the business for at least five years after the
23 19 T.C. 481 (1952).
24 Ibid., at 485.
25 7 B.T.A. 574 (1927).
26 14 B.T.A. 1428 (1929), rev'd on another issue, 59 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1932).
273 B.T.A. 399 (1927).
2 8 INT. REV. CODE §7482(a).
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publication date. In the face of this, the Commissioner's determination
that the catalogs had a useful life of five years is not unreasonable.
It is respectfully submitted that the Tax Court decision in the Sheldon
case is the more realistic approach to the issue. The position of the
Tax Court should be adhered to where the advertising expenditure
results in a tangible asset, whereas that of the Circuit Court of Appeals
should be restricted in its application to cases where some intangible
asset is acquired.
RicHARa J. AsH
Statute of Frauds-The Effect of Promissory Estoppel-Plain-
tiff purchased a home next to the vacant property of the defendant.
The house was of a modern design and.of a functional nature. It was
constructed at such a place so as to take advantage of a "terrific"
view to the south and west. Before purchasing the dwelling, however,
plaintiff spoke to the defendant and they reached an oral agreement
as to the approximate location of defendant's house on the adjoining
property when constructed. The defendant assured the plaintiff that
he would not interfere with plaintiff's view by any building. After
plaintiff bought the property, defendant started to construct a house
inconsistent with the oral agreement and which would interfere with
plaintiff's-view of the country side. Plaintiff brings this suit to enjoin
the defendant from building any structure which ignores the oral
agreement as to view.' Defendant defends upon the Statute of Frauds.
Held: The defendant, his heirs, and assigns and any subsequent own-
ers of defendant's property shall be permanently prohibited from con-
structing any building which will interfere with the view from the
house of the plaintiff or his successors until the termination of the
use of the view. Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W. 2d. 267 (Iowa, 1953).
This case presents a somewhat unusual problem in the fact that the
interest contracted for is a nonpossessory one.2 Consequently the
usual incidents of "part performance" in the familiar sense of the
doctrine are absent. There is no contemplated entry by the grantee
into possession, nor is there any possibility of a substantial improve-
ment by the grantee of the subject lands. Either or both such circum-
I Plaintiff in an attempt to avoid the Statute of Frauds relied upon section 622.23
of the Iowa code which reads as follows: "Exception: The provisions of
subsection 3 of section 622.32 do not apply where the purchase money . . . has
been received by the vendor, or when the vendee, with the actual or implied
consent of the vendor, has taken and held possession of premises under or by
virtue of the contract, or when there is any other circumstances which, by the
law heretofore in force, would have taken the case out of the statute of
frauds." IOWA CODE (1950) I.C.A.
2 "There can be no seizin of an incorporeal hereditamnent and it can not be the
subject of entry or possession. 'It lyeth in grant, and not in livery'." The City
of Racine v. Crotsenberg, 61 Wis. 481, 21 N.W. 520 (1884) ; For a statement
on the general subject see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §8.16 (1952).
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